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THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND PRIVATE 
LANDOWNER INCENTIVES
JEFFREY A. MICHAEL
Abstract: While intended to increase the habitat available to endangered species, the restrictions of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) increase the costs of harboring an endangered species to private landowners and create incentives for private landowners 
to reduce habitat. This paper illustrates the incentive for habitat destruction with a simple model of private land use under 
the ESA, and uses it to predict the effects of changes in policy or biological conditions on private landowner incentives. Many 
anecdotal accounts and recent empirical research support the predictions of the model. Because of the ESA’s perverse incentives, 
many have proposed replacing the punitive regulations of the ESA with positive incentives for habitat creation, including takings 
compensation, negligence compensation rules, tradable development rights, and land purchase programs. The paper concludes 
by reviewing economic analysis of these proposals’ effectiveness. 
Key words: Endangered Species Act, incentives, private property.
In 1973, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) passed 
with near unanimous support in both the House and the 
Senate. Recent attempts at reauthorization have been 
much more contentious. In fact, Congress has failed to 
reauthorize or amend the bill since it last expired in 
1992. The ESA has been renewed on an annual basis 
since 1992, as the debate over revision and reautho-
rization continues to drag on. Several environmental 
groups are strongly opposed to any significant revisions 
to what some say is the nation’s toughest environmental 
law. Opponents of the current ESA argue that the act 
requires a few private landowners to provide a benefit 
to the public (endangered species habitat), while private 
landowners bear all of the costs (restrictions on land use 
and development). 
The popularity and vast regulatory power of the 
ESA are important statements of the value Americans 
place on preventing the extinction of plants and ani-
mals, yet the law creates incentives for certain private 
landowners to take actions that harm endangered spe-
cies recovery. To avoid costly land use regulations, land-
owners may engage in preemptive habitat destruction of 
currently unoccupied but potential endangered species 
habitat, conceal or hinder the collection of information 
about endangered species on their property, or even 
kill endangered species (commonly known as “shoot, 
shovel, and shut-up”). For simplicity, this paper primar-
ily focuses on preemptive habitat destruction. The next 
section provides background on the ESA and is followed 
by a simple land use decision model that illustrates 
the habitat destruction incentive. This is followed by 
anecdotal and scientific evidence of habitat destruction,  
and a discussion of the economics of compensating 
private landowners for providing endangered species 
habitat.
BACKGROUND
The 1973 Endangered Species Act is the broadest 
and most powerful law in a century-old history of pro-
tecting fish, wildlife, and plants through national legisla-
tion. Two weaker laws, the 1966 Endangered Species 
Preservation Act and the 1969 Endangered Species Con-
servation Act, preceded the ESA. These laws provided 
a limited amount of money for the purchase of endan-
gered species habitat as reserves and required the Secre-
tary of Interior to publish a list of endangered animal 
species. They also prohibited taking endangered species 
on federal wildlife refuges and required federal agencies 
to consider the impacts of their actions on endangered 
species “to the extent practicable.” It was not until the 
1973 ESA that federal law required endangered species 
conservation on private lands.
The key provisions of the ESA for private land-
owners are found in Section 9. These provisions made it 
unlawful to take any endangered or threatened species 
on both public and private lands. Section 3 defined 
“take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” In 1975, the Secre-
tary of Interior clarified the broad definition of “take” by 
defining “harm” as:
“An act or omission which actually injures 
or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy 
it to such an extent as to significantly dis-
rupt essential behavioral patterns, which 
include, but are not limited to, breeding, 
feeding, or sheltering; significant environ-
mental modification or degradation which 
has such effects is included within the 
meaning of “harm.”
There have been several judicial rulings regarding the 
takings prohibitions of Section 9. In the most important 
Section 9 case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Communities 
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for a Greater Oregon (1995), the Supreme Court over-
turned a lower court’s decision and upheld the broad 
definition of “take” that includes habitat alteration.
Congress passed amendments to the ESA in 1978, 
1982, and 1988. The 1978 amendments set up a formal 
process for exemptions to the requirements of federal 
agencies in section 7 and were prompted by the famous 
snail darter case (TVA v. Hill 437 U.S. 153 (1978)) in 
which construction was stopped on a nearly completed 
federal dam to save habitat for an endangered minnow. 
The 1982 amendments required listing solely on biologi-
cal grounds, prohibiting economic factors from being 
considered in the listing process, and extended taking 
prohibitions to endangered and threatened plants on 
federal lands. Of most importance to private land-
owners, the 1982 amendments also allowed incidental 
taking of an endangered species if a Habitat Conserva-
tion Plan (HCP) was approved by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) that provided mitigation for the 
takings. Infrequently used for over a decade, HCPs have 
become a focal point of recent ESA enforcement on 
private lands. The 1988 amendments increased civil and 
criminal penalties for ESA violations, and protected spe-
cies that were proposed but not yet listed.
Since the last reauthorization of the ESA expired 
in 1992, Congress has simply appropriated funds on 
an annual basis to keep the ESA in force. Dozens of 
reauthorization bills have been proposed in both houses 
of Congress, but none of the bills have made it to the 
floor of the House or Senate for a vote. In general, 
the reauthorization bills sponsored by supporters of the 
ESA contain few changes to the current law, while bills 
sponsored by ESA opponents generally contain combi-
nations of several reforms: peer-review, no surprises, 
and takings compensation. Peer-review would increase 
the rigor of scientific review before a species is listed. 
Several species have been removed from the ESA after 
subsequent biological studies have determined that the 
species was never endangered (Mann and Plummer 
1995), and the goal of peer-review is to stop these 
mistakes. Critics of peer review believe the provisions 
are only an attempt to weaken the efficacy of the ESA 
by slowing down the listing process. A no surprises 
clause would prohibit the FWS from adding any land-
use restrictions or financial burdens on a landowner 
with an approved habitat conservation plan. Many 
HCPs already include a no surprises clause, but this 
change would automatically make it a part of all 
HCPs. In proposed reauthorization bills, takings com-
pensation usually takes the form of mandating full com-
pensation whenever ESA regulations reduce property 
values beyond a threshold, usually a 20 to 33% reduc-
tion in property values. As discussed later in the paper, 
economists generally support some type of landowner 
compensation but most do not support the full compen-
sation beyond a threshold rule that is the standard in 
reauthorization bills requiring private landowner com-
pensation (Brown and Shogren 1998, Innes, et al. 1998).
HR 3160 (The Common Sense Protections for 
Endangered Species Act) is currently the leading reau-
thorization bill in the 106th Congress. Similar to Senate 
Bill 1180, the leading reauthorization bill in the 105th 
Congress that failed to pass despite some bipartisan 
support, HR 3160 requires peer review in the listing 
process, forces FWS to consider economic and social 
impacts of recovery plans, requires no surprises policies 
in HCPs, and provides small grants to landowners for 
habitat conservation. A companion bill, HR 1142 (Land-
owners Equal Treatment Act), would provide compensa-
tion to landowners for whom ESA regulation reduced 
property values over 25%. HR 960 (Endangered Species 
Recovery Act) is an alternative bill supported by much 
of the environmental community that provides estate 
tax deferral to those who agree to endangered species 
conservation agreements on their inherited property 
but offers few other changes affecting private landown-
ers. 
A MODEL OF THE HABITAT DESTRUCTION 
INCENTIVE
A simple decision tree model (Fig. 1) can be used 
to illustrate private landowner incentives under the ESA. 
The model is not a comprehensive model of the ESA but 
rather a model focused on the basic incentives facing 
a landowner whose land is potential habitat for a cur-
rently listed species. The preemptive development deci-
sion is illustrated using a 2-period model with nature 
and 2 agents – a landowner (L) and a government 
agency enforcing the ESA, the FWS. Initially, the land 
harbors no endangered species, but the land is potential 
habitat for an endangered species. The land’s value as 
habitat (to the species) depends on the landowner’s 
behavior. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the decision-making timeline. 
The landowner can choose to maintain (m) or destroy 
(d) potential habitat in period 1. Destroying habitat has 
a one-time cost (C
D
) and generates benefits (B
D
) from 
development such as timber harvest. C
D
 is the cost of 
developing early, for example, harvesting timber before 
it has reached the landowner’s optimal harvest age. 
Nature (N) moves after the landowner and determines 
the population levels of an endangered species, which 
depends on the land use choice made in period 1. If 
the habitat is destroyed, the probability that the endan-
gered species inhabits the land is zero. If the habitat is 
maintained, there is a probability (δ) that a population 
of the species will inhabit the land because of migration 
from nearby populations.
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If the habitat is maintained and becomes popu-
lated with an endangered species (the lowest branch in 
Fig. 1), the FWS will detect the presence of an existing 
endangered species in period 2 with probability (δ). If 
FWS detects an endangered species, it regulates land 
use (under section 9) so that habitat cannot be altered. 
Because FWS detection depends on the probability an 
endangered species inhabits the land, the probability of 
the ESA being in force is, assuming independent events, 
δδ< 1 and the probability that the ESA will not be in 
force is (1-δδ) <1. If the ESA is in force, the firm loses all 
benefits from development in period 2 (B
D
 = 0 in period 
2) but may earn a smaller amount of benefits from an 
alternative land use (B
A
 < B
D
) that does not harm the 
endangered species habitat. If, however, L waits until 
period 2 to develop, he faces no costs of development 
(C
D
 = 0). In the absence of the ESA, it is clear that the 
optimal time to develop is in period 2 to avoid the extra 
costs of developing in period 1. 
The landowner chooses his or her action in 
period 1, develop or maintain habitat, in order to maxi-
mize the expected value of the land. Thus, the land-
owner will choose to destroy the habitat as long as the 
expected value of early development exceeds that of 
waiting, or: 
[B
D
-C
D
] > (1-δδ)B
D
 + (δδ)B
A
  (1)
The decision to destroy or maintain habitat will 
depend on the value of these parameters and leads to 
several straightforward predictions. First, increases in 
the probability that an endangered species will inhabit 
the land (δ) will increase the probability of preemptive 
habitat destruction. In other words, the habitat that 
is most important to the recovery of the endangered 
species is the most likely to be developed. Second, 
increases in the probability that the FWS will detect a 
listed species (δ) will lead to more habitat destruction.  
This probability could increase because of conditions 
(e.g., specific to a location) that reduce detection costs 
or because of increases in detection and enforcement 
resources for FWS. Thus, the increased enforcement 
budgets called for by ESA supporters would lead to 
more habitat destruction on private lands. Third, as 
the relative value of development (B
D
/B
A
) increases, 
habitat destruction is more likely. Strengthening the crit-
ical habitat requirements for a particular species would 
decrease B
A
 and thus increase the incentive for habitat 
destruction. Recent enforcement changes that rely more 
on HCPs or a change in policy to include some type of 
landowner compensation increase B
A
 and reduce habitat 
destruction. Finally, when the costs of development (C
D
) 
are low, preemption is more likely. These costs could be 
low if simple practices like grazing or plowing are suf-
ficient to destroy habitat. These costs are also low when 
a species is tied to well-defined and narrow habitat type, 
such as the red-cockaded woodpecker (RCW), the spot-
ted owl, and the golden-cheeked warbler. Wolves and 
bald eagles, for example, have much less well-defined 
habitat requirements and successful preemption would 
be relatively costly.
EVIDENCE OF HABITAT DESTRUCTION ON 
PRIVATE LANDS
Anecdotal evidence of preemptive habitat 
destruction has been building for a variety of species 
from a variety of sources, including journalists, biol-
ogists, government officials, economists, lawyers, and 
environmentalists (e.g., Dolan 1992, Mann and Plummer 
1995, Kennedy et al. 1996, Wilcove et al. 1996, Stroup 
1997, Thompson 1997, Epstein 1997, Ruhl 1998). Per-
haps the most famous reported case is that of North Car-
Fig. 1.  Decision tree for landowner under the ESA.
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olina landowner Ben Cone, who dramatically increased 
his harvest of old growth pine in response to potential 
ESA regulations (Stroup 1997). In 1991, the FWS 
restricted Cone from harvesting timber on 1,500 acres 
of his 7,200-acre property to protect 12 colonies of the 
endangered RCW. A consultant estimated the market 
value of timber on the 1,500 acres to be US$2 million 
(roughly US$1,300 per acre). In response, Cone pro-
ceeded to clear-cut potential woodpecker habitat on 
nearby but currently unregulated acres. Rather than 
waiting to cut trees at age 80, he cut them at age 
40 before they were prime RCW nesting habitat. Cone 
also sent a letter to his neighbors describing the situ-
ation, and at least one soon began clear-cutting his 
pine stands. In Texas, Mann and Plummer (1995) report 
habitat destruction for the golden-cheeked warbler and 
Ruhl (1998) reports the same for the black-capped vireo. 
Gidari (1994) finds evidence of clear-cutting in the 
Pacific Northwest in order to avoid logging restrictions 
designed to protect the northern spotted owl. Dolan 
(1992) and Seasholes (1997) find less-known cases in 
California (where development values are high) and 
elsewhere around the country. The National Association 
of Home Builders actually advises preemption in its 
Developers Guide to Endangered Species Regulation 
(1996, p. 109; cited in Bean 1998, p. 10706), 
“The highest level of assurance that a prop-
erty owner will not face an ESA issue is to 
maintain the property in a condition such 
that protected species cannot occupy the 
property . . . This is referred to as the 
‘scorched earth’ technique.” 
This anecdotal evidence is further supported by a 
recent scientific study investigating the timber harvest 
choices of landowners in areas of North Carolina that 
are home to the red-cockaded woodpecker. Lueck and 
Michael (2000) use data on over 1,000 individual forest 
plots from the U.S. Forest Service’s Forest Inventory and 
Analysis and the results of a 1997-98 survey of over 400 
private landowners to test the hypothesis that the closer 
a landowner is to known populations of RCWs, the more 
likely the landowner will take action to destroy the 
habitat for RCWs, primarily by “prematurely” cutting 
their pine forest. By preventing the establishment of 
an old growth pine stand, landowners can insure that 
RCWs do not inhabit their land and avoid ESA regula-
tions that limit or prohibit timber harvest activity. Data 
from the Nature Conservancy’s Natural Heritage Pro-
gram on RCW colony location was used to construct 
various measures of the probability that a forest plot 
will become inhabited by RCWs. Probit regressions esti-
mate the probability that a plot is harvested and ordi-
nary least squares regressions (corrected for harvest 
selection bias) estimate the age at which a plot is har-
vested. After accounting for economic conditions and 
landowner characteristics, Lueck and Michael (2000) 
find that increases in the proximity of a plot to RCWs 
increases the probability that the plot will be harvested 
and decreases the age at which the forest is harvested. 
Specifically, a given forest plot is about 30% more likely 
to be harvested when located in an area with large 
numbers of RCWs, and the age of the stand at harvest is 
predicted to be 39 years compared to 46 years in an area 
with low numbers of RCWs. 
Lueck and Michael (2000) use these results to 
estimate the reduction in pine forest acreage suitable for 
RCWs between 1984 and 1990. They find that between 
12,253 and 69,359 additional acres of mature pine were 
harvested in North Carolina in order to avoid potential 
ESA regulations. In the 5-county Sandhills region alone, 
where RCWs are most populous, and an area targeted 
by the FWS for recovery, the preemption acreage ranges 
from 6,634 to 29,927. Looking more closely at the Sand-
hills region, the preempted habitat acreage would be 
sufficient to support between 33 and 150 colonies of 
RCWs, assuming a typical habitat of 200 acres per RCW 
colony. Considering that only 70 colonies of RCWs can 
be found on private lands in this region (Campbell 
1998), it appears that the ESA led to the destruction 
of as much habitat as it protected around private-land 
colonies.
EFFICIENT COMPENSATION OF PRIVATE 
LANDOWNERS
A number of theoretical papers address the issues 
of takings, compensation and private landowner incen-
tives under the ESA (Miceli and Segerson 1996, Innis 
1997, Polasky et al. 1997, Smith and Shogren 1997, 
Stroup 1997, Brown and Shogren 1998, Innes et al. 1998, 
Polasky and Doremus 1998, Innes 2000), and other 
types of government regulation (Blume et al. 1984). In 
general, the papers specify game theoretic models of 
private landowner and government regulator behavior 
with the objective of deriving the optimal compensation 
level to private landowners that eliminates the incentive 
for preemptive habitat destruction and concealing infor-
mation from regulators, and results in a socially efficient 
level of endangered species conservation. The compen-
sation rules evaluated include full compensation for 
lost private use values (the type of takings compensa-
tion proposed in recent legislation), payment equal to 
the public conservation value of the habitat preserved, 
negligence compensation rules, tradable development 
rights, and government purchases of desired habitat 
under eminent domain.
Standard takings compensation (full payment of 
the loss in private use value in the event of endangered 
species regulation) is inefficient for 2 reasons. First, it 
fails to reward landowners for improvements in the 
public conservation value. Second, it creates an incen-
tive to overdevelop in some settings because landown-
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ers do not need to consider the public conservation 
value of their land (Blume et al. 1984). An efficient 
compensation scheme will cause a private landowner to 
value each of their land use alternatives at the same level 
as society. Under takings compensation, the landowner 
receives the private use value whether they commit 
the property to conservation or development purposes. 
In addition to the overdevelopment incentive, takings 
compensation invites contrived claims and would entail 
large administrative and legal costs (Goldstein and 
Watson 1997).
Private land-use incentives are fully aligned with 
social benefits and costs when landowners are paid 
the public conservation value of their land (pigouvian 
compensation). Public conservation value includes both 
the market and nonmarket value of all the conservation 
benefits produced by the undeveloped land that are 
received by someone other than the landowner. How-
ever, the efficient compensation scheme would be dif-
ficult to implement in practice because of the difficulty 
in accurately quantifying the public conservation value 
and the large sum of public funds necessary to pay it. 
Although economists have made great advances in quan-
tifying values for nonmarket goods such as endangered 
species protection, nonmarket valuation techniques are 
still controversial and determining nonmarket values for 
individual properties would have high research costs. 
Pigouvian compensation may also involve a greater bud-
getary cost than takings compensation. When consider-
ing the efficiency (deadweight) costs of raising these 
funds through the tax system, the high budgetary out-
lays necessary for pigouvian compensation could sub-
stantially reduce the social efficiency of such a policy 
(Innes et al. 1998).
An ideal system creates incentives similar to 
pigouvian compensation at lower budgetary costs to 
the government. Innes (2000) shows that this could 
be achieved under a linear compensation rule that 
penalizes landowners for higher private land values or 
through the use of a negligence compensation rule. 
Under a negligence compensation rule, landowners 
with endangered species habitat receive positive com-
pensation only if they take socially efficient actions 
to protect the public conservation value of their land. 
A negligence compensation rule reduces the overin-
vestment incentive of standard takings compensation, 
because landowners will no longer undertake develop-
ment solely for the purpose of eliciting greater amounts 
of takings compensation. 
The difference between takings compensation 
and a negligence compensation rule can be illustrated 
by considering a simple example of beachfront property 
where conservation as endangered species habitat has 
a higher social value than development. Under takings 
compensation, the landowner may have an incentive to 
wastefully enhance the property’s development value, 
for example by building a road. By increasing the devel-
opment value, the landowner buttresses his or her tak-
ings claim and increases the chance that the claim 
exceeds the value loss thresholds (e.g., 25%, 33%) speci-
fied in the takings law. Under a negligence compen-
sation rule, the landowner triggers compensation by 
taking actions that enhance the property’s conservation 
value, such as protecting or planting dune grass. In 
practice, the difficulty of implementing such a system is 
determining whether or not a landowner has efficiently 
protected the property’s public use value.
Extensions to the basic optimal compensation 
models include consideration of multi-parcel, spatial 
issues in compensation rules, tradable development per-
mits, and asymmetric information between regulators 
and landowners. Incorporating spatial issues makes it 
efficient to offer higher payments to adjacent landown-
ers providing endangered species habitat (Smith and 
Shogren 1997) because clusters of habitat are potentially 
more valuable to the long-term recovery of species. A 
policy of tradable development rights improves eco-
nomic efficiency with zero government outlay because 
those who buy the permits compensate those who sell 
development permits and give up their property for 
public use as endangered species habitat (Kennedy et 
al. 1996). By lowering the cost of endangered species 
to development-minded landowners, tradable develop-
ment rights reduce but do not eliminate the incentive 
for preemptive habitat destruction. Habitat destruction 
incentives are reduced because development-minded 
landowners with endangered species can develop their 
property if they purchase permits from a landowner 
that will mitigate the resulting habitat loss. If the per-
mits have high prices, endangered species will still be 
a costly liability for landowners who may still choose 
to destroy habitat in order to protect against the need 
to purchase development permits. Low permit prices 
reduce or eliminate the incentive for preemptive habitat 
destruction but do not provide much of an incentive 
for habitat creation or enhancement. There are also 
significant administrative difficulties in such a system 
for endangered plant and wildlife habitat.
Asymmetric information could involve landown-
ers withholding biological information from the regula-
tor (Polasky and Doremus 1998) or withholding infor-
mation about their private conservation values, and thus 
their willingness to accept lower payments to provide 
habitat (Innes et al. 1998). Stroup (1997) argues that 
a market approach with a budget constraint and com-
pensation paid in the form of land and easement pur-
chases or habitat rental will result in the government 
seeking out low-cost providers of habitat and the low-
cost producers coming forward. Low-cost producers of 
endangered species habitat are those with high private 
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conservation values so that habitat conservation has a 
relatively small impact on the land’s private use value. 
These landowners may be willing to protect habitat for 
far less than full compensation and would make up 
the lower portion of supply curve for endangered spe-
cies habitat where “willingness to accept payment for 
habitat protection” is the vertical axis and “habitat acres 
preserved” is the horizontal axis.
A straightforward alternative to the landowner 
compensation rules discussed above is full government 
acquisition of habitat for the creation of biodiversity 
protection reserves. Unlike the compensation rules, the 
acquisition of biodiversity reserves could be pursued as 
a supplement to the current ESA and would not neces-
sarily change the way private landowners are regulated 
under the ESA. Ando et al. (1998) used data on the 
location of endangered species and average county land 
values in the U.S. To solve a budget constrained site-
selection problem that maximized the number of endan-
gered species covered by reserves. Their results showed 
that optimal reserve locations were concentrated in the 
southwestern states such as Arizona, Nevada, and New 
Mexico. Polasky et al. (1999) have solved a similar, more 
detailed problem for selecting forest reserve sites in 
Oregon. Because these studies assume the outright pur-
chase of properties for a biodiversity reserve, the cost 
of adding acreage to a reserve is the price of land. 
An alternative strategy is the purchase of conservation 
easements, where the definition of cost is the difference 
between the unregulated market value of the land and 
the value of alternative land uses that preserve adequate 
habitat. For example RCW can thrive on properties used 
for quail hunting, golf courses, pine straw raking, and 
residential development even though the most valuable 
use of most properties, short rotation timber produc-
tion, does not provide suitable habitat. Solving the low-
cost easement purchase problem would likely result in 
a different distribution of reserves and is a question 
that merits further research. A problem with the reserve 
purchase approach is that assembling large reserves 
will ultimately require the government to acquire some 
properties via eminent domain rather than a voluntary 
sale with individual landowners. The involuntary nature 
of such a program could lead to political problems and 
potentially create new incentive problems despite full 
compensation.
Another alternative to private landowner compen-
sation recognizes that the key to the ESA’s perverse 
incentives is the ability of private landowners to manip-
ulate the conservation value or development value of 
their land through their management choices. Polasky 
et al. (1997, pp. 72-73) state:
“In order to effectively limit the ability of 
landowners to manipulate outcomes, regu-
latory decisions must be based on factors 
that are difficult for landowners to manipu-
late. In the species conservation context, 
regulators might assess the land’s potential 
suitability for listed species rather than the 
current presence or absence of those spe-
cies. Suitability might be judged on the 
basis of soil type, topography, and climate 
conditions – factors largely outside land-
owners’ control.”
The location of a property with respect to species 
location, public lands, and existing habitat is another 
important criteria that could be used to judge suitability. 
Of course, regulating land based on suitability rather 
than the actual presence of endangered species may 
be politically difficult. However, such criteria could be 
effective if policy changed to embrace market mecha-
nisms such as land and easement purchases, and rental 
payments in place of the current regulatory approach.
CONCLUSION
Current reauthorization proposals for the ESA 
only recommend limited or inefficient compensation for 
private landowners such as standard takings compensa-
tion, estate tax credits, and cost sharing for habitat 
improvements. No legislation has proposed payments 
that are linked to public conservation value, utilize neg-
ligence rules, or provide payments at any level less 
than full takings compensation. In addition, no propos-
als include funds for simple land acquisition despite 
the fact that funding for public purchase of properties 
and conservation easements for other environmental 
reasons are very popular. Many states (e.g., Colorado, 
Maryland) have authorized millions of dollars for land 
and easement acquisition and it appears the proposed 
Lands Legacy program will authorize several hundred 
million (if not more than a billion) dollars in federal 
funds for similar purposes. Ultimately, endangered spe-
cies policy on private lands must address the fact that 
landowners can affect the public conservation value of 
their land through their management choices. Because 
of this, traditional regulatory approaches such as the 
current ESA and policies that punish landowners for 
harm are ineffective. In this setting, where public use 
values are in private hands, positive compensation is 
necessary for social efficiency. The challenge for future 
economic research is to consider how theoretical deri-
vations of efficient, low-cost compensation rules can be 
made simple and easy to implement in practice.
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